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11 Introduction
In the theory of general equilibrium under uncertainty, besides being deﬁned by their
physical properties and location in space and time, commodities are also deﬁned by
the state of nature in which they are made available.1 With this extension of the
commodity space, the model of Arrow and Debreu (1954) covers the case of trade
ex ante with public state veriﬁcation. First, agents make contracts to exchange
their state-contingent endowments for a state-contingent consumption plan, that
speciﬁes a consumption bundle for each possible state of nature. After the state
of nature is publicly announced, trade takes place and each agent consumes the
bundle that corresponds to the announced state.
With private state veriﬁcation, trade becomes more complicated. Agents may not
be interested in buying good A1 (delivery of good A in state 1) because they may
fear that, even if state 1 occurs, they may not be able to verify (for example, to
prove in a court of law) that state 1 occurred, and that they are, therefore, entitled
to receive good A. Suppose that an agent cannot verify whether the true state
is 1 or 2. The traditional Walrasian approach would be to restrict the agent to
consumption plans that deliver the same bundle in the two states.2 We suggest
a weaker restriction: the agent has to accept any of the bundles contracted for
delivery in state 1 and state 2. Equivalently, the market has two alternatives: to
deliver the bundle that corresponds to state 1, or the bundle that corresponds to
state 2. The agent, in turn, has no alternative other than to accept the bundle that
is delivered.3
This relaxes, in a natural way, the measurability restriction. An agent may select
diﬀerent bundles, A and B, for delivery, respectively, in states 1 and 2, that he does
not distinguish. But, in any of these states, the market may choose to deliver A or
B. It is as if the agent had bought the same list, A∨B, for delivery in both states.
In a previous paper (2006), we introduced this conceptual model of an economy
with uncertain delivery, where objects of choice are lists of bundles out of which the
market has discretion to select a bundle for delivery. For example, the list A ∨ B
1For example, instead of talking about good A in state 1, or good B in state 2, we talk about
good A1 or good B2. These goods are known as contingent consumption claims (Arrow, 1953).
2See Radner (1968), Yannelis (1991) and the volume on ‘diﬀerential information economies’
edited by Glycopantis and Yannelis (2005).
3For example, suppose that what is decisive for the agent is not to know whether the true state
is 1 or 2, but to have the ability to prove it in a court of law.
2gives an agent the right to receive bundle A or bundle B.
Deﬁned in terms of lists instead of bundles, ‘measurability’ is not an exogenous
restriction on trade. It is rather a way to formalize an actual enforceability issue.
Consider an agent that cannot verify, for example, in a court of law, whether the
true state is 1 or 2. If the agent buys A1 (delivery of good A in state 1) and B2,
the market may deliver A1 and B2, but may also deliver A1 and A2, B1 and A2
or B1 and B2. In sum: the agent receives ‘good A or good B’ in states ‘1 and
2’, that is, (A ∨ B)1 and (A ∨ B)2. Observe that an agent can buy something
that is not ‘measurable’, but, in practice, the ‘set of alternatives that may be
delivered’ is measurable - in this case it is ‘A or B’ in both states that the agent
does not distinguish. Since, without loss of generality, we can convert (as above)
any non-measurable choice into a measurable one, this ‘measurability’ restriction
(on ‘lists’) does not restrict trade agreements. It describes the consequences of
private information in terms of actual outcomes.
It should be clear that we are handling a weaker informational restriction, than the
usual measurability. An agent always has the possibility of buying lists with only
one bundle in order to guarantee consumption of the same bundle in states of nature
that he does not distinguish. Therefore, eﬃciency of trade frequently improves (and
never diminishes) relatively to the Walrasian Expectations Equilibrium solution.
A possible interpretation of the model of an economy with uncertain delivery is
the following. Each agent deals with a broker, who oﬀers plans of state-contingent
lists in exchange for the agent’s state-contingent endowments. The broker takes
the state-contingent endowments to an ‘internal market’ and trades them for a
state-contingent consumption plan (the cheapest) satisfying the requirements of
the plan of lists selected by the agent. Among themselves, then, brokers trade
state-contingent commodities in an ‘internal’ Arrow-Debreu market. We assume
that brokers always keep their contracts and that they make no proﬁts. As a result,
the price charged for a list is equal to the price (in the internal market) of the
cheapest bundle that satisﬁes the requirements of the list. Otherwise there would
be opportunities for arbitrage. The price of a list is a linear function, and there is
no price discrimination as introduced by Aliprantis, Tourky and Yannelis (2001).4
An example is helpful in understanding this interpretation. Consider three states
of nature, and a broker oﬀering a contingent plan of lists, ˜ x = [(a ∨ b ∨ c),(a ∨ b ∨
4If all alternatives in a list vary proportionally, the cheapest alternative remains the same, and
its price (which is equal to the price of the list) varies in the same proportion.
3c),(d ∨ e)]. The broker has many ways of keeping the contract. One is to buy (in
the internal market) the state-contingent bundle (a,b,d), another is to buy (c,c,e),
or (a,c,e), etc. In any case, in state 1 and state 2 (ﬁrst and second coordinates)
delivery must be of a, b or c, and in state 3 (third coordinate) delivery has to be of
d or e. Delivering one of these bundles, the broker keeps the contract. The choice
of the broker will surely be the cheapest of the alternatives. Thus, this cheapest
bundle has two fundamental characteristics: (1) its price is the price charged for
the list (the competitive brokers have no proﬁt); and (2) it is the bundle that will
be delivered. In this way, the prices of lists are uniquely determined by the prices
of the contingent commodities in the internal market. Selection of bundles to be
delivered is also determined internally. In sum, the ‘internal market mechanism’ is
responsible for price-setting and for the selection of the bundles to be delivered to
each agent in each state of nature, among the possibilities speciﬁed in the lists.
In this paper we study the case in which agents have subjective beliefs. Facing a
list and the prevailing prices, agents construct subjective expectations on the prob-
abilities of receiving each of the diﬀerent bundles in the list. These expectations,
in turn, determine preferences over lists. The main objective is to give conditions
that guarantee existence of equilibrium.
We remark that, in this model, the preferences of the agents for lists depend on
their subjective expectations, and therefore may be a function of prices.5 It is
not that agents prefer to consume expensive or cheap bundles. What happens is
that agents take the prices of the diﬀerent bundles as a signal of the probability
of delivery of each of the bundles in a list, and this implies that their preferences
for lists are price-dependent. This makes sense because prices are related to the
economic diﬃculty to deliver the goods.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the main section, preferences and
prices are extended from bundles to lists, the model is presented, and existence of
equilibrium is established. In section 3 we make some remarks and conclude the
paper with an example.
5With price-dependent preferences, it is known that equilibrium exists (Arrow and Hahn, 1971).
Existence of equilibrium in economies with price-dependent preferences was recently studied by
Cornet and Topuzu (2005).
42 The economy with uncertain delivery
An economy with uncertain delivery is a diﬀerential information economy in which
objects of choice are state-contingent plans of consumption lists instead of state-
contingent plans of consumption bundles. A list is a set of bundles such that the
market delivers one of the bundles in the list.
2.1 Basic setup
We consider a ﬁnite number of agents (i = 1,...,n), a ﬁnite number of possible
states of nature (s = 1,...,S), a ﬁnite number of commodities, (j = 1,...,l), and
a ﬁnite number of alternatives in a list (k = 1,...,K). The private information of
agent i is represented by a partition of the set of states of nature such that agent
i can distinguish states that belong to diﬀerent sets of the partition Pi. The set of
states that agent i does not distinguish from s is denoted Pi(s). A function that is
constant across elements of Pi is said to be Pi-measurable. Consumption of agent i
in state s is xs
i ∈ IRl
+, and the contingent consumption plan of agent i is xi ∈ IRSl
+.
The list selected by agent i for delivery in state s is denoted ˜ xs
i ∈ IRKl
+ , with the kth
alternative being ˜ xsk
i ∈ IRl
+. The state-contingent plan of lists selected by agent i is
˜ xi ∈ IRSKl
+ .
The economy extends over two time periods. In the ﬁrst, agents observe prices
and trade their state-contingent endowments for Pi-measurable vectors of state-
contingent lists, ˜ xi = (˜ x1
i, ˜ x2
i,..., ˜ xS
i ), specifying the bundles that the market may de-
liver in each state of nature. In the second period, agents receive their information,
and consume one of the bundles in the list that corresponds to the state of nature
that occurs. If the state of nature is s, agent i receives one of the bundles ˜ xsk
i in
the list ˜ xs
i.
For example, suppose that the set of possible states of nature is Ω = {1,2,3}, the
private information of agent i is Pi = {{1,2},{3}}, and the (measurable) vector of
consumption lists is ˜ xi = (˜ x1
i, ˜ x2
i, ˜ x3
i) = [(a ∨ b ∨ c),(a ∨ b ∨ c),(d ∨ e ∨ e)]. In the
second period, if the state of nature is 1 or 2, agent i receives a, b or c; if it is 3,
then the agent receives d or e.
52.2 From bundles to lists
There is a correspondence from bundles to lists playing a fundamental role in the
model. For example, delivery of the bundle x keeps the contract for delivery of the
list (x ∨ y), but would not keep the contract for delivery of (2x ∨ x + y), because
both alternatives exceed x (given an x and y that are not null). With the delivery
of a bundle xs ∈ IRl
+ in state s, the market can keep the promise of delivery of any
list in ˜ X(xs), deﬁned as:
˜ X(x
s) = {˜ x
s = (˜ x
s1,..., ˜ x
sK) ∈ IR
Kl
+ : ∃k s.t. ˜ x
sk ≤ x
s}.
Each agent chooses a Pi-measurable vector of contingent lists, ˜ xi = (˜ x1
i,..., ˜ xK
i ), so
it makes sense to extend the correspondence to the whole set of states of nature.
Delivery of xi = (x1
i,...,xS
i ) ∈ IRSl
+ keeps the contract for delivery of any list in
˜ XS(x), deﬁned as:
˜ X
S(xi) = ˜ X(x
1
i) × ˜ X(x
2
i) × ... × ˜ X(x
S
i ).
A more explicit deﬁnition of the same correspondence is:
˜ X(xs
i) = ∪K
k=1{(IRl
+)k−1 × [0,xs
i] × (IRl
+)K−k}.
In this deﬁnition, [0,xs] denotes the set of bundles ys such that 0 ≤ ys ≤ xs.
For example, with two alternatives and a single commodity: x = 1 implies that
˜ X(x) = {[0,1] × IR+} ∪ {IR+ × [0,1]}. This formulation makes it clear that ˜ X is a
continuous correspondence (lower and upper hemicontinuous), because it is a ﬁnite
union of a ﬁnite product of continuous correspondences.
2.3 Prices of lists
We seek equilibrium prices deﬁned on lists, restricting our search to prices that
satisfy a no arbitrage condition: the price of a list ˜ x is equal to the price of the
cheapest bundle, x, that keeps the contract for delivery of ˜ x.
To see that this is (in its essence) a no arbitrage assumption, suppose that
there is an intermediary (broker) between an agent and the market. The inter-
mediary promises to deliver a state-contingent list in exchange for the agent’s
state-contingent endowments. In the market, the intermediary trades the agent’s
endowments for a bundle, x, that satisﬁes the requirements of the list, that is, for
an x such that ˜ x ∈ ˜ XS(x). Finally, the intermediary delivers x to the agent, keeping
6the promise to deliver a bundle in ˜ x. If ˜ p(˜ x) > p·x, another intermediary is willing
to oﬀer the list at a lower price. If ˜ p(˜ x) < p · x, no intermediary is willing to make
this trade. In sum, lists are traded at a price equal to the price of the cheapest
bundle satisfying ˜ x ∈ ˜ X(x), and, therefore, it is enough to determine the prices
of the contingent goods (primitives). The prices of lists (derivatives) follow as a
consequence.
As usual, prices of the contingent commodities are normalized to the unit simplex
of IRSl
+:
p ∈ ∆
Sl
+ =


p ∈ IR
Sl
+ :
S X
s=1
l X
j=1
p
sj = 1


.
The price of a list, ˜ p(˜ xi), is:
˜ p
s(˜ x
s
i) = min
k
{p
s · ˜ x
sk
i };
˜ p(˜ xi) =
S X
s=1
˜ p
s(˜ x
s
i) =
S X
s=1
min
k
{p
s · ˜ x
sk
i }.
Therefore, the budget restriction faced by agent i is:
˜ Bi(ei,p) = {˜ xi ∈ IR
SKl
+ :
S X
s=1
min
k
{p
s · ˜ x
sk
i } ≤
S X
s=1
p
s · ˜ x
s
i = p · ei}.
2.4 Subjective expectations
When selecting a list, agents form ‘subjective expectations’ on the probability of
receiving each of the bundles in the list. These beliefs depend on the observation
of prices, which signal the cost of delivery of each alternative. The only common
information that we assume is that agents know that the total resources in the
economy belong to the set [0,T)Sl. Consequently, they attribute a null probability
of delivery to alternatives which are outside this set. This allows us to write lists
in a compact set, ˜ XS = [0,T]SKl.6
Let Esk
i (˜ xs
i,p) represent the subjective probability of receiving the kth alternative
in the list ˜ xs
i, given prices p. Let also Es
i = (Es1
i ,Es2
i ,...,EsK
i ), with
PK
k=1 Esk
i = 1,
and Ei = (E1
i ,E2
i ,...,ES
i ).
6A list with less than K alternatives can be represented in the same space by completing
the remaining coordinates with the bundle (T,...,T) (an irrelevant alternative), or with repeated
alternatives.
7Given prices, p, and a list ˜ xs
i for delivery in state s, agent i has subjective
expectations regarding the probabilities of delivery of each of the bundles in the
list, given by the vector:
Es
i : [0,T]Kl × ∆Sl
+ → ∆K
+;
Es
i(˜ xs
i,p) = (Es1
i (˜ xs
i,p),Es2
i (˜ xs
i,p),...,EsK
i (˜ xs
i,p)).
Preferences in the diﬀerent states of nature are represented by a Pi-measurable
vector of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, us
i : IRl
+ → IR, assumed to be
continuous, weakly monotone and concave. The function ˜ us
i : IRKl
+ → IRK returns
the vector ˜ us
i(˜ xs
i) = (us
i(˜ xs1
i ),...,us
i(˜ xsK
i )). Agents combine subjective expectations
with preferences for consumption to maximize a subjective expected utility function:
˜ Ui(˜ xi,p) =
S X
s=1
q
s
iE
s
i(˜ x
s
i,p) · ˜ u
s
i(˜ x
s
i) =
S X
s=1
q
s
i
K X
k=1
E
sk
i (˜ xi,p)u
s
i(˜ x
sk
i ).
To guarantee existence of equilibrium, an hypothesis of continuity is needed. A
small change in prices or in the alternative bundles in the list must imply only a
small change in the subjective probabilities of delivery of the diﬀerent alternatives
in the list. It may seem natural to assume continuity of Ei, but this would be too
restrictive. For example, suppose that there are only two alternatives in the list and
they are equal, ˜ xs = (a,a). If the ﬁrst diminishes a little, to (a−δ,a), then the agent
may expect the market to deliver this smallest bundle with certainty, Es
i = (1,0).
While if it is the second alternative that diminishes a little, to (a,a − δ), then the
expectations may be Es
i = (0,1). In a previous paper (2006), we assumed these
‘prudent expectations’, which are incompatible with assuming continuity of Ei.
We will allow failures of continuity, but only of a precise nature. Jumps of prob-
ability beliefs can only occur between alternatives that are equal or that at least
have the same utility.
Before stating the hypothesis, we aggregate alternatives in a given contingent list
according to their utility: G(k) = {k0 : us
i(˜ xsk0
i ) = us
i(˜ xsk
i )}. Similarly, let G(k,) =
{k0 : |us
i(˜ xsk0
i ) − us
i(˜ xsk
i )| < }, and notice that for small  the sets deﬁned are the
same. The continuity condition on expectations is the following:
Assumption 1
Consider a given (˜ xs
i,p), and let  > 0 be small enough for G(k,) = G(k), ∀k.
Let F
sk
i (˜ x
s
i,p;) =
X
k0∈G(k,)
E
sk0
i (˜ x
s
i,p). Then, F
sk
i (˜ x
s
i,p;) is continuous at (˜ xs
i,p).
8Observe that, from continuity of us
i, small changes in (˜ xs
i,p) preserve the sets G.
Therefore, in a neighborhood of (˜ xs
i,p), we have the following equality that shows
continuity of subjective expected utility:
˜ Ui(˜ xi,p) =
S X
s=1
q
s
i
K X
k=1
E
sk
i (˜ xi,p)u
s
i(˜ x
sk
i ) =
S X
s=1
q
s
i
X
G(k,)
F
sk
i (˜ x
s
i,p,)u
s
i(˜ x
sk
i ).
This continuity condition is strong enough to imply continuity of subjective
expected utility and weak enough to allow ‘subjective expectations’ to encompass
‘prudent expectations’ as a particular case. In the case of ‘prudent expectations’,
only the worst alternatives have positive probabilities (in this set: F sk
i = 1) and
the only kind of continuity failure in ‘prudent expectations’ are transferences of
probability between equally worse alternatives, which do not violate assumption 1.
We also make an assumption related to no satiation. There exists a small positive
vector that, when added to the vector of lists, leaves expectations unchanged.7
Assumption 2
Consider (˜ xi,p) and  > 0. There exists 0 < z ≤  such that:
Ei(˜ xi + z,p) = Ei(˜ xi,p).
This implies that with additional resources, z, it is possible to design a list such
that ˜ Ui(˜ xi + z,p) > ˜ Ui(˜ xi,p). This, in turn, implies that the brokers use all the
value of the agent’s endowments. Otherwise, the preferred list, ˜ xs
i, could be one
that implied delivery of xi with ˜ p(˜ xi) = p · xi < p · ei.
A convexity condition is also necessary. It would be enough to assume that ˜ Ui(˜ xi,p)
is quasi-concave. But this restriction would be too strong. To see this, consider
two commodities and linear utility: u(x,y) = x + y. We have u(2,0) = u(0,2) = 2
and u(2a,0) = u(0,2a) = 2a. Let a > 1. How much is ˜ U((2,0) ∨ (0,2a))? And
˜ U((0,2)∨(2a,0))? Both lists imply consumption of bundles with utility of either 2
or 2a. Suppose that agents look beyond the worst outcome: ˜ U((2,0) ∨ (0,2a)) > 2
and ˜ U((0,2) ∨ (2a,0)) > 2. But, looking at the average allocation, [(1,1) ∨ (a,a)],
a ‘prudent’ agent would expect the market to deliver (1,1), and not (a,a), because
(1,1) < (a,a). This violates quasi-concavity: ˜ U((1,1) ∨ (a,a)) = u(1,1) = 2.
7For alternatives with some coordinate already at the bound T, the increase may be null. This is
only necessary for the new list to remain in [0,T]Sl. With positive or null increase, the expectation
that corresponds to such alternatives is zero, because agents know that total endowments are in
[0,T)Sl.
9We impose a weaker convexity assumption: given prices p, if the bundle x ∈ IRSl
+
allows the broker to oﬀer a list ˜ x, and y ∈ IRSl
+ allows the oﬀer of a list ˜ y with
the same subjective utility, then, any convex combination z = λx + (1 − λ)y, with
λ ∈ [0,1], allows the broker to oﬀer a list ˜ z with at least the same subjective utility
as ˜ x and ˜ y.
Assumption 3
Given prices p, consider two lists, ˜ x ∈ ˜ XS(x) and ˜ y ∈ ˜ XS(y), with ˜ U(˜ x,p) =
˜ U(˜ y,p). Then, for any convex combination z = λx+(1−λ)y, with λ ∈ [0,1], there
exists a list ˜ z ∈ ˜ X(z) with ˜ U(˜ z,p) ≥ ˜ U(˜ x,p).
An example of expectations that induce preferences which satisfy assumption 3 are
the prudent expectations (minimax preferences), according to which agents expect
to receive the worst alternative with certainty.
2.5 The model
The economy with uncertain delivery is deﬁned by E ≡ (ei,ui,Pi,qi,Ei)n
i=1, where,
for each agent i:
- A partition of the set of possible states of nature, Pi, represents private
information. The set of states that agent i does not distinguish from state s
is denoted Pi(s).
- A vector qi represents the subjective prior probabilities on the occurrence
of the diﬀerent states of nature. To each state s corresponds the subjective
probability qs
i ≥ 0, with
PS
s=1 qs
i = 1.
- For each state s, a subjective expectations vector function, Es
i(˜ xs
i,p) :
[0,T]Kl × ∆Sl
+ → ∆K
+, gives the subjective probabilities of delivery of each
of the K bundles in the list ˜ xs
i. These functions are constant across undistin-
guished states, that is, the vector Ei = (E1
i ,...,ES
i ) is Pi-measurable.
- Preferences in the diﬀerent states are represented by a Pi-measurable vector
of Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, us
i : IRl
+ → IR, assumed to
be continuous, weakly monotone and concave. The function ˜ us
i : IRKl
+ → IRK
returns the vector ˜ us
i(˜ xs
i) = (us
i(˜ xs1
i ),...,us
i(˜ xsK
i )). The subjective expected
10utility function combines beliefs with preferences for consumption: ˜ Ui(˜ xi,p) =
PS
s=1 qs
iEs
i(˜ xs
i,p) · ˜ us
i(˜ xs
i) =
PS
s=1 qs
i
PK
k=1 Esk
i (˜ xi,p)us
i(˜ xsk
i ).
- The initial endowments are Pi-measurable and strictly positive: es
i  0 for
all s = {1,...,S}.
The problem of agent i is to maximize subjective expected utility, restricted to the
budget set:
max
˜ xi∈ ˜ Bi(ei,p)
˜ Ui(˜ xi,p) = max
˜ xi∈ ˜ Bi(ei,p)
S X
s=1
qs
K X
k=1
E
sk
i (˜ xi,p) ˜ u
s
i(˜ x
sk
i ).
A subjective expectations equilibrium of the economy with uncertain delivery is a
triple, (˜ x∗,x∗,p∗), composed by a price system p∗, an allocation x∗ = (x∗
1,...,x∗
n),
and Pi-measurable vectors of lists ˜ x∗
i. These are such that, for every agent i:
(1) The list ˜ x∗
i maximizes subjective expected utility, ˜ Ui(˜ x∗
i,p∗), in the agent’s
budget set, ˜ Bi(ei,p∗).
(2) The bundles selected for delivery, x∗
i, belong to the set of alternatives deﬁned
in the lists ˜ x∗
i, that is, ˜ x∗
i ∈ ˜ XS(x∗
i).
(3) The allocation, x∗, is feasible. That is,
X
i
x
∗
i ≤
X
i
ei.
Taking prices as given, each agent trades its initial endowments, ei, for a Pi-
measurable vector of state-contingent lists, ˜ x∗
i, that maximizes subjective expected
utility, ˜ Ui(˜ xi,p∗), in the budget set, ˜ Bi(ei,p∗).8 The brokers take the endowments
of the agents to an internal market for contingent goods, where they trade among
themselves, seeking to buy bundles that satisfy the requirements of the lists that
they promised to deliver to the agents. Brokers should buy the cheapest of the
bundles that keep their promises, and, in this case, the price that they pay for these
bundles is equal to the price that they charged for the list. These are the bundles
that the agents actually receive for consumption, and obviously must constitute a
feasible allocation.
8The information of the agents is such that, if state s occurs, they can only claim the right
to receive a bundle that is in one of the lists ˜ xt
i with t ∈ Pi(s). This way, any vector of state-
contingent lists, ˜ yi, can be substituted by one that is Pi-measurable, with the set of alternatives
in state s being ˜ xs
i = ∪t∈Pi(s){˜ yt
i}.
112.6 Existence of equilibrium
To establish existence of equilibrium, it is useful to deﬁne ﬁrst a sort of ‘perceived
utility’ or ‘value function’, Vi(xi,p), as the maximum expected utility of a list that
the bundle xi can deliver.
Vi(xi,p) = max
˜ xi∈ ˜ XS(xi)
˜ Ui(˜ xi,p).
Lists have a maximum of K alternatives, and bounded coordinates, that is, ˜ xi ∈
[0,T]SKl. This way, the correspondence from bundles to sets of lists, ˜ XS(x), is
continuous with non-empty compact values. Since the objective function, ˜ Ui(˜ xi,p),
is continuous, we can apply Berge’s Maximum Theorem to ﬁnd that the value
function, Vi(xi,p), is continuous. Assumption 3 implies that the set of bundles xi
that maximizes V (xi,p) in the budget set is convex.
A hidden budget restriction can be deﬁned in terms of bundles instead of lists. The
cost of a list equals the cost of the cheapest alternative. Thus, lists in the budget
of an agent must belong to some ˜ XS(x), with x ∈ Bi(ei,p).
Bi(ei,p) =
(
xi ∈ [0,T]
Sl, such that
S X
s=1
p
sx
s
i ≤
S X
s=1
p
se
s
i
)
.
The problem of the consumer can be solved in two steps:
xi = argmaxx∈Bi(ei,p)Vi(x,p);
˜ xi = argmax˜ x∈ ˜ X(xi) ˜ Ui(˜ x,p).
The idea of the proof is to ﬁnd (x∗,p∗) using a classical ﬁxed-point argument, and
then determine ˜ x∗ solving the second step of the consumer’s problem.
Theorem 1
Let E ≡ (ei,ui,Pi,qi,Ei)n
i=1 be an economy with uncertain delivery satisfying
assumptions 1, 2 and 3.
There exists a triple (˜ x∗,x∗,p) that is an equilibrium of E.
Proof.
Consider correspondences, ψi, which assign to given prices, p, bundles, x0
i, that
maximize Vi(xi,p) in the budget set, Bi(ei,p).
ψi : [0,T]nSl × ∆Sl
+ → [0,T]Sl;
12x0
i ∈ ψi(x,p) ⇔ x0
i = argmaxxi∈Bi(ei,p){Vi(xi,p)} , ∀i.
Consider also a correspondence, ψp, that assigns to the total demand,
P
i xi, the
prices, p0, which maximize the value of excess demand:
ψp : [0,T]nSl × ∆Sl
+ → ∆Sl
+;
p0 ∈ ψp(x,p) ⇔ p0 = argmaxp∈∆Sl
+ {p ·
P
i(xi − ei)}.
We know that the objective functions, Vi and Vp(x,p) = p ·
P
i(xi − ei), are
continuous, and that Bi(ei,p) is a continuous correspondence. We are, therefore,
in the conditions of application of Berge’s Maximum Theorem, which shows that
each of the correspondences ψi and ψp is upper hemicontinuous with non-empty
and compact values. They also have convex values because the objective functions
are quasi-concave. The product correspondence retains these properties and maps
a compact set into itself:
ψ ≡
n Y
i=1
ψi × ψp;
ψ : [0,T]
nSl
+ × ∆
Sl
+ → [0,T]
nSl
+ × ∆
Sl
+;
(x
0,p
0) ∈ ψ(x,p) ⇔ x
0
i ∈ ψi(x,p), ∀i and p0 ∈ ψp(x,p).
Existence of a ﬁxed-point, (x∗,p∗), follows from Kakutani’s Theorem.
The fact that p∗ maximizes the value of excess demand implies that:
p0 ·
P
i(x∗
i − ei) ≤ p∗ ·
P
i(x∗
i − ei) ≤ 0, for all p0 ∈ ∆Sl
+.
Making p0 = ej = (0,...,1,...,0), for each j, shows that x∗ is a feasible allocation:
P
i(x∗
i − ei) ≤ 0.
Observe also that x∗
i solves the ﬁrst step of the consumer’s problem.
Finding the lists that are oﬀered to the agents solves the problem of the consumer,
and completes the triple of equilibrium (˜ x∗,x∗,p∗). By continuity and compacity,
we can ﬁnd the lists that maximize ˜ Ui(˜ x∗
i,p∗) among those that can be oﬀered with
resources x∗
i:
˜ x∗
i = argmax˜ xi∈ ˜ XS(x∗
i ) ˜ Ui(˜ xi,p∗).
This completes the proof. QED
In equilibrium, the delivered bundles, x∗
i, have two important properties, which
support the interpretation of the market mechanism as being driven by informed
brokers trading in an internal market:
13(1) The Law of Walras is satisﬁed;9
(2) The delivered bundles are the cheapest among the alternatives in the list.10
3 Concluding Remarks
In economies with uncertain delivery, objects of choice are lists of bundles and
the market selects one of the bundles in the chosen list for delivery. Economic
equilibrium can be seen (but not necessarily) as the result of the interaction between
agents and brokers. Brokers oﬀer lists in exchange for the agent’s endowments, and
then trade among themselves in order to obtain a bundle that keeps the contract
for delivery of the list that they promised to the agent.
Agents can only guess the probabilities of receiving each of the bundles in a list.
Existence of equilibrium with subjective expectations is conditional on the speciﬁc
expectations (see assumptions 1, 2 and 3). In essence, the expectations functions,
Ei(˜ xi,p), must imply continuity, quasi-concavity and monotonicity of the perceived
utility, Vi(xi,p), of the bundles used by the brokers to design lists for the agents.
In this model, agents trade before receiving their private information. Accordingly,
the solution it is more comparable with the concept of Walrasian Expectations
Equilibrium (WEE - Radner, 1968), which can also be seen as an ex-ante notion,
than with the concepts of Rational Expectations Equilibrium (REE - Radner, 1979)
and Bayesian Walrasian Equilibrium (BWE - Balder and Yannelis, 2005), which are
interim notions. Notice that, with trade being made ex ante, the state of nature
cannot be revealed by prices, because it still did not occur.
An assumption made here that is common to the BWE is that agents are not
assumed to know all the primitives in the economy (the random initial endowments,
random utility functions and private information sets of all the agents). On the
9It is easy to see that assumption 2 implies weak monotonicity of Vi(xi,p). As a result,
maximizers are in the frontier of the budget set. This, in turn, implies that Law of Walras is
satisﬁed: p∗ ·
P
i x∗
i = p∗ ·
P
i ei = 0.
10To see this, notice that if this was not the case, a small positive z could be added to the
cheapest alternative, x0
i, to construct a deliverable list, ˜ Ui(˜ x∗
i + z,p∗), with more utility (as a
consequence of assumption 2), and still with p∗ · (x0
i + z) ≤ p∗ · ei. This would imply that
Vi(x0
i + z,p∗) > Vi(x∗
i,p∗), a contradiction.
14other hand, our measurability restriction is weaker, as it is imposed on lists and not
on the actual allocation.
In economies with uncertain delivery, agents are not restricted to consume the same
bundle in states that they are not able to distinguish (in the sense of verifying the
diﬀerence, for example, in a court of law). Agents buy lists of bundles, having the
right to receive one of the bundles in the list. As a consequence, they may receive
diﬀerent alternatives in states that they do not distinguish.
Eﬃciency of trade is improved in a certain sense. For given prices, the maximizing
choice of agents yields higher utility for everyone than under the restriction of
equal consumption in undistinguished states (increase in indirect utility is a natural
consequence of the extension of the consumption set). Yet, this does not imply a
Pareto improvement of welfare because equilibrium prices will be diﬀerent from
those that constitute the WEE. Obviously, the new equilibrium prices will be more
favorable to some agents, but may be more adverse to others. Some agents may
not beneﬁt with the opening of markets for lists.
The expansion of trade possibilities does not create problems of incentive compat-
ibility. As in diﬀerential information economies, the Pi-measurability restriction
(that here is in terms of lists) implies Bayesian incentive compatibility (Kout-
sougeras and Yannelis, 1993). On the other hand, ‘coalitional Bayesian incentive
compatibility’ is not guaranteed in general, since we assumed “free disposal” (Gly-
copantis, Muir and Yannelis, 2002).
An example
To clarify the equilibrium concept presented in this paper, we recast the example
of Kreps (1977), as did Balder and Yannelis (2005). Consider an economy with
two agents, A and B, two equally probable states of nature, Ω = {s,t}, and two
goods, 1 and 2, in each state of nature. The informed agent, A, distinguishes the
two states: PA = {{s};{t}}; while the uninformed agent, B, does not: PB = {s,t}.
The agents make trade agreements before receiving their contingent endowments
and their information. Endowments are given by:
eA(s) = eA(t) = eB(s) = eB(t) = (1.5,1.5).
Their state-dependent utility functions are:
us
A(x(s)) = ln(x1(s)) + x2(s); ut
A(x(t)) = 2ln(x1(t)) + x2(s);
us
B(x(s)) = 1.5ln(x1(s)) + x2(s); ut
B(x(t)) = 1.5ln(x1(t)) + x2(t).
15To have a speciﬁc form for the expectations functions, Ei(˜ xi,p), we assume that the
agents have prudent expectations. This is a particular case of subjective expectations
where agents expect to receive the bundle with the lowest utility (independently of
prices, p). In this case, adding alternatives to a list does not increase its utility.
Anyway, an agent may choose a list with several alternatives if it makes the list
cheaper - this occurs when prices are diﬀerent in states that the agent does not
distinguish (Correia-da-Silva and Herv´ es-Beloso, 2006).11
The informed agent, A, distinguishes everything, and, therefore, simply maximizes
expected utility:
UA(xA) = 0.5ln(xA1(s)) + 0.5xA2(s) + ln(xA1(t)) + 0.5xA2(t).
Agent B may gain by choosing a list with two alternatives, in spite of not knowing
which alternative will be delivered in each state. Assuming ‘prudent expectations’:
UB(xB) = minj=s,t{1.5ln(xB1(j)) + xB2(j)}.
Equating marginal rates of substitution to price ratios, we obtain:
1
xA1(s) =
p1(s)
p2(s); 2
xA1(t) =
p1(t)
p2(t); 1 =
p2(s)
p2(t); 1.5
xB1(s) =
p1(s)
p2(s); 1.5
xB1(t) =
p1(t)
p2(t).
An alternative price normalization makes calculations easier: set p2(s) = p2(t) = 1.
This yields:
1
xA1(s) = 1.5
xB1(s) = p1(s); 2
xA1(t) = 1.5
xB1(t) = p1(t).
Solving:
p1(s) = 5
6; p1(t) = 7
6; p · eA = p · eB = 6;
xA(s) = (1.20,1.75); xA(t) = (1.71,1.25); us
A = 1.935; ut
A = 2.326; UA = 2.130;
xB(s) = (1.80,1.25); xB(t) = (1.29,1.75); us
B = 2.129; ut
B = 2.129; UB = 2.129.
In this example, the WEE and the private core are the initial endowments (Glyco-
pantis, Muir and Yannelis, 2005). There is no trade.
xA(s) = (1.5,1.5); xA(t) = (1.5,1.5); us
A = 1.905; ut
A = 2.311; UA = 2.108;
xB(s) = (1.5,1.5); xB(t) = (1.5,1.5); us
B = 2.108; ut
B = 2.108; UB = 2.108.
It is straightforward to interpret the welfare gains generated by uncertain delivery.
Buying a list with two alternatives, agent B guaranteed the right to receive
11Remember that the price of a list is equal to the price of the cheapest bundle that can be
delivered to keep the contract for the delivery of the list.
16(1.80,1.25) or (1.29,1.75). This ﬂexibility of agent B relatively to the allocation is
welfare enhancing. Good 1 is more useful to agent A in state t than in state s, thus
the market ‘appreciates’ the possibility of delivering more of this good to agent B in
state s than in state t (in return, the market delivers more of good 2 in state t than
in state s).12 Agent B prefers any of the alternatives in the list, (1.80,1.25) and
(1.29,1.75), to the autarky solution, (1.50,1.50). Moreover, agent B is indiﬀerent
between the two alternatives. Therefore, the possibility of being deceived does not
worry the uninformed agent.
Our result diﬀers from that given by BWE, which is an interim notion. The BWE
allocation is (Balder and Yannelis, 2005):
xA(s) = (1.45,1.54); xA(t) = (1.46,1.55); us
A = 2.277; ut
A = 1.931; UA = 2.104;
xB(s) = xB(t) = (1.54,1.46); us
B = 2.110; ut
B = 2.110; UB = 2.110.
12It may be veriﬁed that the cheapest way for a broker to deliver the list bought by agent B is
to deliver (1.80,1.25) in state s and (1.29,1.75) in state t.
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